Each day more and more women come forward to share their stories of abuse within the workplace and without. And people are actually listening.

In the not-so-distant past, the primary concern for some employers may have been the legal consequence of firing a worker after she internally reported sexual harassment. Now, as women become more emboldened to speak up and as the public becomes more receptive to listening, employers have more to worry about than just the legal repercussions. In the year 2018, merely an accusation could end a career, or even a business. Thus, it is more important now than ever for employers to implement workplace procedures for preventing harassment and properly handling accusations.

Addressing sexual harassment requires first understanding what it looks like. It might surprise you to know that harassment is likely much broader than you think. In general there are two types of sexual harassment—quid pro quo and hostile work environment. The hostile work environment cases are typically more difficult to prove because the question arises of just how hostile the environment must be.

Sexual harassment falls under the category of sex discrimination, which is impermissible under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. To be actionable under Title VII, the conduct must be “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.” Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (internal quotations omitted). A worker need not suffer an adverse economic effect to meet this standard. And, the inquiry does not center on whether the sex-related (not sexual-related) conduct was voluntary, but rather focuses on the unwelcome nature of the behavior.

Thus, even conduct that appears to be tolerated by a subordinate or coworker may constitute sexual harassment if the advances are unwelcome. Considering that the courts struggle with the concept of unwelcome versus welcome conduct, employers and their supervisors should hesitate to assume that seemingly innocent behavior is ok with a female (or even a male) colleague.

When employers receive a complaint of sexual harassment, they must act. In the current climate, the public will not accept a company’s claim of ignorance. Sticking your head in the sand is no longer a viable option when a woman comes to you to say “me too.”

 

77064643 – online slap, the relationship of men and women

The Texas Citizens Participation Act (“TCPA”)[1], enacted in 2011, is the Texas version of an Anti-SLAPP[2] statute, which have been enacted by over 30 states around the country to protect free speech and the right of association of private citizens under the First Amendment from harassing and baseless litigation aimed at curtailing those rights.

Intended for a worthy and important goal, the statutes were shepherded by an interesting coalition of large media corporations, law professors and civil libertarians. The Texas statute was also passed unanimously by both the Texas House and Senate-indeed, seemingly, everyone can agree that the right of private citizens to exercise their First Amendment rights to free speech and free association should not be chilled by meritless lawsuits.

However, because the wording of the TCPA is so broad (and goes far beyond traditional protections of free speech,) and because the Texas Supreme Court, and various courts of appeal around the state, have not backed down from enforcing the statute, exactly as written, lawsuits one would never expect to infringe upon First Amendment Rights have been tossed out of court.

The result has been to create a tool that arguably has been used to shut down legitimate claims under the guise of protecting citizens’ First Amendment Rights. Practitioners and concerned citizens alike should be aware of the statute and the surprising ways in which it is applied.

The Statutory Provisions.

Some of the key definitions under the TCPA include:

“(2) ‘Exercise of the right of association’ means a communication between individuals who join together to collectively express, promote, pursue, or defend common interests.

(3) ‘Exercise of the right of free speech’ means a communication made in connection with a matter of public concern.

. . .

(7) ‘Matter of public concern’ includes an issue related to:

(A) health or safety;

(B) environmental, economic, or community well-being;

(C) the government;

(D) a public official or public figure; or

(E) a good, product, or service in the marketplace.”[3]

Court Decisions and Unintended Consequences.

The Texas Supreme Court first set the example for interpreting the statute and enforcing it-exactly as written-in a seemingly surprising manner in the Coleman decision.[4]

In Coleman, a former employee sued ExxonMobil Pipeline for defamation, alleging that his employer had wrongfully accused him of falsifying records when terminating his employment.

ExxonMobil filed a motion to dismiss the suit under the TCPA. The Texas Supreme Court held the defamation action should be dismissed under the TCPA because the decision to terminate the employee was “related to health and safety, or the environmental, economic, or community well-being” and was a matter of public concern under the plain meaning of the statute, despite the communication of the reasoning for termination being transmitted solely between the management of the company and with Coleman himself.

According to his former employer, Coleman had failed to properly measure or report the correct measurement of petroleum products in a storage tank. That pedestrian reason for his dismissal was transformed into ExxonMobil Pipeline’s First Amendment right to free speech because, under the court’s reasoning and ExxonMobil’s argument, mismeasurement could have led to an accident-thus, meeting the statutory definition of a “matter of public concern” under the portion of the definition which includes the language, “an issue related to: health or safety . . . [or] environmental, economic, or community well-being . . .”

The Coleman decision laid down a marker for the courts of appeal around the state that the plain meaning of the statutory language must be enforced regardless of the impact on seemingly legitimate lawsuits or the original intent of the statute’s drafters.

Elite Autobody Decision.

The Third Court of Appeals at Austin has issued decisions containing possibly the most-extreme examples of the application of the Texas Supreme Court’s logic in interpreting the plain meaning of the TCPA, as laid out in Coleman.

In the Elite Autobody[5] decision, the Austin court of appeals applied Coleman to a TCPA motion to dismiss in a traditional, run of the mill, commercial trade secrets case between two competing Autobody repair shops in Austin, Texas.

Employees left Autocraft to work for Elite. Elite sued Autocraft claiming the employees had stolen trade secrets (typical internal company information including employee pay and personnel information, customer information and alleged compilations of proprietary technical data.) These type of suits generally turn on whether or not the alleged trade secrets actually deserve trade secret protection. However, Autocraft also filed a motion to dismiss under the TCPA.

The court held that the suit was properly dismissed because of the (broad and) plain meaning of the statute, the suit was found to infringe on the departed employees’ right of association because they were free to go to a new employer and their communication of their former employer’s company information was held to be a “communication between individuals” who were joining together to “pursue common interests.”

Despite the fact that the original proponents of the statute had the lofty goal of protecting citizens’ First Amendment rights from harassing and chilling lawsuits, the literal wording of the statute has lead Texas courts to apply it to-and dismiss-routine competition cases, and cases further far afield.

Out-of-Control Helicopter Parenting Condoned or Rendered Unactionable?

The Third Court of Appeals has recently handed down a more extreme example of this philosophy of statutory construction in its decision in Cavin v. Abbott.[6]

The Cavins were upset that their adult daughter, Kristin was dating Bill Abbott. The turn of events that followed is a harrowing reminder of the potential abuse of over-parenting-to say the least.[7] The decision itself demonstrates how far the “plain meaning” of the statute extends.

Kristin, in her mid-20’s was living in an apartment paid for by her parents while attending graduate school at the University of Texas. She met Bill Abbott through work and they began dating. Bill was older than Kristen and Kristen’s parents made it known, with increasing intensity that they did not want the couple to date-despite Kristin’s repeated protestations of her love and requests that they back-off.

Eventually, Kristin’s parents (allegedly) physically assaulted Kristin (on two separate occasions-one of which resulted in her mother’s arrest,) wrote scathing social media posts, and contacted both Bill’s and Kristen’s employers, accusing Bill of being a sociopath and using Marxist mind-control techniques to brainwash their daughter. When family members and friends wrote Kristin to side with her or give her encouragement, the Cavins sued them in lawsuits demanding damages of a million dollars, and more. A myriad of horrifying actions continued. Kristin eventually changed her last name and moved in with Bill, ultimately marrying him. But, Kristen’s parents apparently remained undeterred. The Cavins hired a private investigator and allegedly instructed him to “rattle” Bill by closely following him around, in an open and obvious manner. The Cavins had appeared at Kristin’s work to claim she had been kidnapped and was being held against her will. And, the Cavins recorded and posted a series of videos on the Internet and social media sites discussing the abusive-relationship narrative they were pushing in relation to Kristin and Bill.

Ultimately, Bill and Kristen hired a lawyer to file suit to try to stop Kristen’s parents from pursuing their campaign against the couple. The Abbotts sued the Cavins for conversion, defamation, tortious interference, abuse of process, assault, intrusion on seclusion/invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

The Cavins filed a motion to dismiss under the TCPA.

The Austin court of appeals dismissed the case, except for the assault claim. The reasoning of the court followed the same logic laid out in Coleman. The court emphasized that the “exercise of the right of free speech” set forth in the statute, as to a matter of “public concern” “includes an issue related to . . . health or safety.” The court held that the communication need only be made “in connection with” an issue related to “health and safety.”

Citing the Coleman precedent, the Austin court stated the Texas Supreme Court has made it clear the TCPA must be enforced, exactly as written. Because the Cavins’ communications about their daughter’s relationship with Bill were literally made in connection with a matter related to their daughter’s health and safety, the TCPA applied and all of the claims had to be dismissed (with the exception of the assault charge relating to a physical altercation with Kristen’s father since the TCPA expressly excepts claims for assault.)

Legacy of Decisions Applying Coleman.

The Supreme Court has made it clear that he statute is to be applied exactly as written-damn the consequences.

Whether you believe the Third Court of Appeals at Austin is on a mission to prod the legislature to revise the TCPA and narrow its broad language, or that they are merely dutifully following Supreme Court precedent, it is also clear that the TCPA is here to stay unless and until it is revised. The TCPA must be incorporated into the litigator’s toolbox and considered very carefully in strategic planning for prosecution or defense of private lawsuits. Citizens in the State of Texas, in turn, should note the application of the courts’ literal interpretation of a well-intentioned law-and both the good and the ill effects, which have resulted.

[1] The Texas Citizens Participation Act, See Tex.Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 27.001-27.011.

[2] SLAPP: Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation.

[3] See Tex.Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 27.001 (2), (3) and (7).

[4] ExxonMobil Pipeline Co. v. Coleman, 512 S.W. 3d 895 (2017).

[5] Elite Autobody LLC v. Autocraft Bodywerks, Inc.,

[6] Cavin v. Abbott, __S.W.3d __, 2017 WL 3044583 (Tex.App.—Austin 2017).

[7] Based upon the “facts” taken as true by the Third Court of Appeals in its decision.

During the last five years, the United States has seen a drastic increase in mass shootings.

On November 5, 2017, just after 11:00a.m., a gunman entered a church in Sutherland Springs, Texas and opened fire. That Sunday morning 26 church patrons were killed and another 20 were injured including men, women and children.

On October 1, 2017, a gunman opened fire on a crowd of concertgoers at a music festival in Las Vegas leaving 58 people dead and 851 injured.

On June 12, 2016, a 29-year-old security guard killed 49 people and wounded 58 others in a nightclub in Orlando, Florida.

On December 14, 2012, a man walked into an elementary school and killed 20 children between the ages of six and seven years old, as well as 6 adult staff members.

In the wake of some of the deadliest mass shootings in U.S. history, many businesses, schools and churches are asking themselves whether they should be doing more with regard to security. From a legal standpoint, the answer may be evolving. As mass shootings become more and more frequent in the United States, what should hosts of large groups be doing to protect their patrons from violence and themselves from liability exposure?

Unfortunately, the answer varies widely depending on the circumstances. Factors such as 1) crowd size, 2) location, 3) specific existing threats, 4) previous security problems and 5) the level of vulnerability of patrons are just some of the issues that should be considered. However, what we believe is reasonable and necessary when it comes to security is evolving rapidly. For example, many “soft targets” such as open venues, churches and schools that previously would not have been expected to have private armed security guards, may need to re-evaluate their security plan given the increase in mass shootings across the country.

While we hope we never reach the point where a jury of our peers is judging our security decisions in retrospect, when addressing security needs from a legal standpoint, consider what is reasonable and prudent given the current environment and substantial increase in mass shootings across the country.

The moral answer to this question is outside the scope of this article; however, from a legal standpoint, in a civil lawsuit alleging inadequate security, a jury would likely be asked to determine whether the Defendant was negligent. Negligence is defined as:

The failure to use ordinary care, that is, failing to do that which a person of ordinary prudence would have done under the same or similar circumstances

In an era where mass shootings are becoming commonplace, churches, schools and businesses should consider that what may have been reasonable (i.e. ordinary prudence) five years ago, is not necessarily reasonable today. At what point does it become negligent to fail to have professional armed security if you are hosting a large, vulnerable group of people? While the answer to this question will vary depending on the circumstances, in the context of a civil lawsuit, a jury will inevitably decide.

So you are a party to a new civil litigation case, which means you have either sued someone or just been sued.  Your lawyer sends you an email that the Court has just set your case for a non-jury trial for a date in the future.  In the same email, your lawyer asks if you want to pay the jury fee, which usually is nominal, and have the matter set for jury trial, or whether you prefer to have the case remain as a non-jury trial.  It is, after all, the client’s decision on whether to have a jury trial or a non-jury trial.  What do you do?

Both types of trials – jury and non-jury – have advantages and disadvantages.  A non-jury trial, also known as a bench trial or a trial before the Judge, generally is more informal than a jury trial,  shorter than a jury trial, and less expensive to prepare for and conduct.   For example, in a non-jury trial, the lawyers do not have to draft a jury charge (the questions the jury will answer, such as who was responsible for the accident, and the percentage of responsibility each party), or have a “charge conference” with the Judge where each side argues that its proposed jury questions should be included in the jury charge.  The charge conference is conducted outside of the presence of the jury, and can last from several hours to an entire day or more, depending on the case.  After the jury charge is finalized, the Judge will read the jury charge to the jury, the lawyers will make closing arguments, and then the jury will retire to the jury room to deliberate.

None of these time-consuming jury charge issues are present in a bench trial.  However, one of the disadvantages of a non-jury trial is that one person – the Judge – hears all the evidence, weighs the credibility of the witnesses, decides which facts are true and not true, rules on evidentiary issues and objections, applies the law to the facts, decides who should win, and the amount of damages awarded, if any.  In a jury trial, the jury hears the evidence, weighs the credibility of the witnesses, decides which facts are true and which are not, decides who should win, and whether any damages should be awarded.  In a jury trial, the Judge’s role is to preside over the trial, rule on evidentiary objections, and apply the law to the facts after the jury has answered the questions on a jury charge – but in most cases, the Judge does get to decide by his-or-herself which party should win.

There are lots of other issues to be considered in deciding whether to have a jury trial or a non-jury trial.  Additionally, a litigant does not always have a choice regarding which type of trial.  We will discuss the additional factors in upcoming posts in this series.

The last decade has seen an unprecedented growth in technology, which has paved the way for internet globalization and given new meaning to the term “international commerce”. Consequently, the digital highway has become populated with modern day highwaymen out for a fast buck. These rogues, known as “cybersquatters”, are individuals who register domain name addresses with the primary purpose of reselling them. Therefore, trademark holders are forced to pay these cybersquatters a substantial amount of money in order to get back a domain name making use of their trademark.  When cybersquatting first reared its ugly head, the only ammunition that trademark holders had was traditional theories based on trademark law. However, these proved to be insufficient in the wake of internet technology, thus necessitating the creation of new enforcement mechanisms. Hence, the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA) was enacted.

In enacting the ACPA, Congress was attempting to create a bright-line rule that would clearly resolve cybersquatting disputes. However, what it has also done is create uncertainty in many cases.  Granted, the Act is useful in cases involving obvious bad faith.  But where the circumstances surrounding bad faith are unclear, the Act is less helpful. In determining bad faith, one of the more important factors in the Act is whether the defendant “offered to transfer, sell, or otherwise assign the domain name to the mark owner or any third party for financial gain without having used, or having an intent to use, the domain name in the bona fide offering of any goods or services.” The difficulty comes in where the court has to determine whether a defendant intended to use the domain name.  It would be very difficult to say with any certainty that someone did not intend to use a name.  It is possible that a defendant registered a domain name with the intention of offering goods and services, but later decided that the business venture was not economically viable.  In this situation, it would make sense to sell the domain name if there were any takers.  However, it is also plausible that the defendant will not be able to prove that it had plans to start a business.  The court might then infer bad faith in a situation where the defendant was nothing more than conscientious in promptly registering a domain name.

It is easy to see how a defendant can be snagged in the cybersquatting net when it had no bad faith intentions to begin with. More important, a defendant’s use of a domain name may not even infringe on a valid trademark. Trademark law in the U.S. is complex with many factors that need to be considered before superior rights are determined. But the problem with the concept of cybersquatting is that it assumes that one of the parties has to be the “bad guy” (usually the domain name registrant). The ACPA can be used to pressure a defendant into giving up a domain name in what is known as “reverse cybersquatting,” and it can be a powerful bullying tool given the substantial penalties that the ACPA inflicts on cybersquatters.

So in the event you receive a cease and desist letter from a business claiming that you wrongfully registered a domain name that infringes on their trademark, do not automatically cave in to the pressure. You need to seek the advice of trademark counsel if you registered the domain name in good faith. You may in fact have superior rights to both the domain name as well as the trademark itself. It could very well be that the accuser is trying to bully you into giving up a domain name that it did not have the foresight to register.

It has become an almost perfunctory practice. You catch wind of another business using a confusingly similar name. You then call a lawyer to immediately send out a cease and desist letter. More often than not, this would be the right play. But there are pitfalls to this strategy if you are not careful. In order to understand how a cease and desist letter can backfire in certain situations, it is important to understand how trademark rights are acquired in the United States. Unlike most countries where trademark rights are granted to the first to register a mark, the U.S. grants such rights to the first to register OR the first to use the mark. When a business obtains a federal trademark registration, it confers nationwide rights to use the mark except for geographic areas where a prior user has established common law trademark rights. A prior user’s common law rights are cemented regardless of whether they registered their mark. If you send a cease and desist letter to such a prior user, you may get a response letter demanding that you cease and desist using your mark in their neck of the woods. In that situation, your federal trademark registration is of no effect, and you risk having the tables turned on you by this prior user (assuming that this prior use was uninterrupted). This is because the prior user established their rights to use that name in their area before you obtained your registration. To add insult to injury, if your trademark registration is less than five years old, the prior user can petition the Trademark Office to cancel your registration! Oftentimes, these prior users are not even aware of your trademark registration. But by sending out that cease and desist letter, you put yourself in their radar and opened up your business to more trouble than the initial demand was worth.

Before you start questioning the utility of a trademark registration given this seemingly unfair situation, keep in mind that when a trademark is registered, it “freezes” all prior users in place so they can no longer expand the use of their current business name. If a prior user in State A later decides to expand into your State B, then you as a trademark registrant can prevent such an expansion. Therefore, before sending out a cease and desist letter you need to be reasonably certain that you are not dealing with a prior user in an overlapping geographic area. With larger businesses, you can possibly determine this with an internet search. But for smaller “mom and pop” shops, you may not be able to determine when they first used the business name in question. There are companies that can provide you with a report on the earliest use of a name by another business. The cost of such a report is relatively modest given what is at stake, and obtaining a report before sending out a cease and desist letter is money well spent. At the very least, a prudent trademark registrant should consider the risks and rewards of pursuing a business using a similar name, and conduct an internet and public records search to get an idea of the pecking order of trademark users in certain geographic areas.

 

Texas has long been one of the best locations to start a business, and a big reason for this is the liability protection afforded by the business-friendly Texas courts. Most business owners seek to limit their personal liability if something goes wrong with the business. This leads to one of the questions I get most often: Which business structure provides more liability protection to the business owner? The short answer is it depends on what happened.

I believe most owners are concerned with what is known as piercing the corporate veil.   “Piercing the corporate veil” is a legal term that means that the owners/members of a corporation or LLC lose the limited liability protection the business entity provided, thus the piercing of the veil of protection. When this happens, personal assets can be used to satisfy business debts and liabilities, not just corporate assets.  The result is that individuals start getting named in lawsuits, in addition to the LLC or corporation they own.

When we look at the Texas Business Organizations Code (TBOC) we see that the two most popular business structures, corporations and limited liability companies, have similar protections for owners. Both organization structures limit liability on contract issues, and absent actual fraud or unless some extraordinary circumstances exist, the veil will not be pierced on a contract action.

But it is a little easier to pierce the corporate veil when it comes to tort liability. Businesses get sued for all kinds of torts, like slip and falls, job site accidents, etc… The two prevailing theories used to pierce the veil in a tort action are the alter ego theory and the single business enterprise theory.

The alter ego theory boils down to looking at how the owners managed internal matters, how the financial interests were kept separated from personal interests and the degree of control the individual had over the company. Basically, was the LLC put in place as a shield to liability or were business formalities observed? The courts will look at everything from the existence of a corporate book to the payment of taxes in order to determine the degree the alter ego was employed.

The other theory used to pierce the veil is the single business enterprise theory. This is used to impute liability to companies that share resources and operate as if they were one entity. This is rarely used, but when it is it can considerably open up the pool of damages available to the plaintiff.

There are a number of other things to consider when analyzing business and personal liability when starting a business. For example, when starting a new business, an owner may need to personally guarantee a business loan. No piercing of the veil is necessary to hold the owner personally liability for the guaranteed debt. Oh, and it goes without saying, no business entity will insulate an owner from criminal liability or protect them if their personal actions cause an injury to someone.

 

 

The Texas Supreme Court in 2015 issued an opinion that should make it easier for defendants to win summary judgment in premises liability cases. In Austin v. Kroger Texas, L.P. (2015), the Court clarified that an invitee’s awareness of a dangerous premises condition does not bear on the issue of contributory negligence, but instead relieves the landowner of a legal duty to warn the invitee of the condition. This holding effectively reinstates the “no duty” doctrine in Texas, which the Court had abolished nearly forty years ago in Parker v. Highland Park, Inc. (1978).

Under the rule announced in Austin v. Kroger, a landowner generally does not have a duty to warn or protect an invitee against unreasonably dangerous premises conditions that are open and obvious or known to the invitee. Establishing that a condition is open and obvious can be difficult. Some judges may find that a condition is open and obvious as a matter of law, while others may submit the issue to a jury. Establishing that the invitee knew about the condition, however, is more straightforward. For example, a plaintiff’s deposition testimony that the plaintiff saw the dangerous condition before the plaintiff got hurt can be enough to defeat the claim entirely.

The new no-duty rule has two exceptions. The first is the criminal-activity exception, which applies when a dangerous condition results from the foreseeable criminal activity of a third party. The second is the necessary-use exception, which applies when the invitee necessarily must use the dangerous premises, and despite the invitee’s awareness of the danger, the invitee is incapable of taking precautions that will adequately reduce the risk. If a plaintiff raises one of the exceptions, defense counsel should argue that it is the plaintiff’s burden to prove the exception applies. After all, a plaintiff is required to prove the defendant owed him a duty, and if a duty would exist only if an exception applies, then a plaintiff should be required to prove the exception.

Although the Supreme Court issued its ruling two years ago, litigants and courts have been slow to catch up. The contributory negligence doctrine is well ingrained and has been instrumental to the analysis of whether a fact issue exists on a premises liability claim. And it appears that many judges are still reluctant to dismiss a plaintiff’s case when confronted with an open and obvious dangerous condition, opting instead to declare a fact issue despite the new legal standard. But in situations where it is proven that a plaintiff was aware of the condition, judges will be hard pressed to ignore Austin. Eventually, the body of law will develop as to what constitutes an open and obvious condition, and courts will then become more comfortable in granting summary judgment in those situations.

In October, I wrote about How the Practice of Law is Like the NHL.  This article was about how rule changes in the practice of law, and changing skill sets in the NHL have made finesse and skill more important than brawling.  Recent experience has shown that this trend continues in law, and that Judges hate “gotcha games.”

Brett Myers and I recently sat through a trial docket call in County Court at Law No. 1 in Dallas County.  While waiting for our turn, we watched Judge Benson make two interesting rulings during a pre-trial hearing for the case ahead of us.

First, Judge Benson ruled that at trial, Defendant could not call as witnesses any of the twenty-three doctors it had recently disclosed.  Interestingly, Defendant’s attorney had added the doctors to Defendant’s disclosure responses forty-five days before trial, which is timely under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.  It did not come out during the hearing whether Defendant’s tardiness was a mistake or was intended as a “gotcha,” so as to not allow Plaintiff to conduct discovery on these witnesses.

Either way, the Judge sustained the Plaintiff’s objection to the witnesses, and held that this late disclosure caused unfair prejudice to Plaintiff.  In her commentary from the bench, Judge Benson said if there had been a timely supplementation of one or two witnesses, it would have been okay, but such a late disclosure of this amount of witnesses simply was not fair.

Second, in a turn of the tables, Judge Benson ruled against Plaintiff for similar reasons.  Defendant’s attorney had produced a video made by Defendant’s expert late according to the rules.  Although the video was produced late according to the technical letter of the law, it was produced eight months before trial.

Rather than taking any action to remedy the tardiness issue, Plaintiff’s attorney waited until a week before trial to object to the video – a clear attempt at a “gotcha.”  The Judge denied Plaintiff’s motion to exclude the video, and allowed Defendant’s expert to use the video.  Judge Benson stated that Plaintiff’s attorney had been in the possession of the video for so long that Plaintiff could not have been prejudiced, and that if Plaintiff felt it was prejudiced, it should have taken action during the intervening time period.

I think there are two lessons to be learned from this experience: 1) Supplement your discovery responses early and often; and 2) If you have a problem, take it up with the Court as soon as possible and do not sit back to try to wait on a “gotcha” ruling from the Court, because you may not get it.

We invite you to read Part 1 and Part 2 in a series of posts by Fox partner Dori K. Stibolt, regarding the new trend in ADA Title III litigation involving web access for the visually impaired.

Many of these cases have focused on travel, hospitality and financial services companies.  However, here in Texas, there has been a micro trend of these web site accessibility cases naming dentists and physicians.